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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joseph Jackson Baxter appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing in part his petition for post-conviction relief and denying the remainder
of the petition following an evidentiary hearing.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinss

A jury found Baxter guilty of injury to jails with an enhancement for being a
persistent violator. (#32668 R., pp. 40-41.) Baxter received a six year unified
sentence comprised of one year fixed and five years indeterminate. (#32668 R.,
pp. 43-48.)

Baxter's sentence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an

unpublished opinion. State v. Baxter, Unpublished Opinion No. 306 (January 3,
2007).
Baxter timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief supported by
affidavits and a brief. (R., pp. 9-59.) The court appointed counsel to represent
Baxter in the post-conviction proceedings. (R., p. 64.) The state subsequently
filed an answer to the petition as well as a separate motion for summary
dismissal. (R., pp. 65-69, 70-87.) The district court filed a notice of intent to
dismiss Baxter's petition. (R., pp. 88-92.) Counsel for Baxter filed a response to
the court's notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp. 93-100.) The district court issued
an order summarily dismissing a portion of Baxter's petition and setting the
remaining claims for evidentiary hearing. (R., pp. 101-113.) Following a limited
evidentiary hearing, the court issued an order dismissing the balance of Baxter's

petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 105-113.) Baxter filed a motion to
reconsider (R., pp. 118-120), which the district court denied. (R., pp. 135-137.)
Baxter timely appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp. 121-124.)

Baxter states the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Baxter's claim
that Idaho Code § 18-7018 is unconstitutional because it did so on
grounds different from those previously asserted by the district court and
the State?
2. Did the district court err when it concluded Mr. Baxter received effective
assistance of trial counsel even though it was objectively unreasonable
that trial counsel failed to argue the jail had not been injured?
3. Did the district court err when it concluded that Mr. Baxter received
effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal even though it was
objectively unreasonable that appellate counsel failed to not [sic]
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence?

(Appellant's brief, pp. 3-4.)
The state rephrases the issues as follows:
1. Has Baxter failed to establish reversible error in the summary dismissal
of his claim, challenging the constitutionality of the charging statute, on grounds
other than those asserted by the state in its motion and adopted by the court in
its notice of intent to dismiss?
2. Has Baxter failed to show that either trial or appellate counsel
performed in an objectively unreasonable manner or that he suffered any
prejudice as a result of their actions?

ARGUMENT

I.
Baxter Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Summarv Dismissal Of
His Claim, Challenqinq The Constitutionalitv Of The Charqinq Statute. On
Grounds Different Than Those Asserted By The State In Its Motion And Adopted
By The Court In Its Notice Of Intent To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
In his pro se brief in support of petition for post conviction relief, Baxter

asserted as his second claim for relief that the injury to jails statute was
unconstitutional. (R., p. 25 ("Is the statute the petitioner was convicted under
Unconstitutional?").) In the state's motion for summary disposition, it combined
the constitutional claim with Baxter's claim of a jurisdictional defect and
requested the court summarily dismiss such allegations because "[tlhe defendant
merely asserts his allegations in a conclusory fashion. The defendant has failed
to sustain his burden of providing affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting these allegations." (R., p. 77.)
The district court then issued a notice of intent to dismiss Baxter's postconviction relief petition after "adopt[ing] the State's briefing as it Findings and
Conclusions in this case" and concluding that Baxter failed to state any genuine
issues of material fact, thereby failing to allege any grounds for post-conviction
relief. (R., p. 90.)
Counsel for Baxter filed a response to the district court's notice of intent to
dismiss. (R., pp. 93-97.) This response addressed a majority of the issues listed
in the state's motion for summary disposition, but failed to respond to the

proposed basis for dismissal of his claim that the statute was unconstitutional.
(R., pp. 95-96.)
The district court thereafter dismissed the majority of the claims in Baxter's
petition, including his claim that the statute was unconstitutional, ruling:
Plaintiff's claims for relief relating to the unconstitutionality of the
statute are dismissed with prejudice for the reason that this issue
should have been raised on direct appeal.
(R., pp. 101-102.)
On appeal, Baxter contends that he is entitled to reinstatement of his claim
challenging the constitutionality of the charging statute, not because the claim is
meritorious, but solely because the district court sua sponte dismissed the claim
without providing him the 20-day notice required by I.C.
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)

3

19-4906(b).

The state agrees with Baxter that the district court

dismissed his claim on a basis not asserted by the state in it motion for summary
disposition or adopted by the court in its notice of intent to dismiss. The state
does not agree, however, that reversal of the district court's order and
reinstatement of the claim is appropriate. Rather, any discrepancy between the
proposed basis for dismissal and the ground ultimately relied upon by the district
court in dismissing Baxter's post-conviction claim is harmless because the claim
fails as a matter of law and there is no additional evidence Baxter could have
presented in support of his claim to establish he was entitled to relief.
B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact

exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 ldaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman

v. State, 132 ldaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.

1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 ldaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).
C.

A Review Of The Record Shows That Any Lack Of Notice For The
Specific Basis Upon Which The Court Dismissed Baxter's Claim That The
Iniurv To Jails Statute Was Unconstitutional Was At Worst Harmless Error
ldaho Code § 19-4906 provides for the summary disposition of an

application for post-conviction relief upon motion by a party or on the court's own
initiative. Follinus v. State, 127 ldaho 897, 899, 908 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App.
1995).

"When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is

contemplating dismissal sua sponfe, it must notify the parties of its intention to
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. State,
123 ldaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted). When the state
files a motion for summary dismissal, setting forth adequate notice of the grounds
for dismissal, and the court grants the state's motion for the reasons urged by the
state, a post-conviction petitioner receives adequate notice of the grounds for
dismissal. Baruth v. Gardner, I 1 0 ldaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App.
1986). The district court cannot, however, "dismiss a claim on a ground not
asserted by the state in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-day notice
required by Section 19-4906(b)." DeRushe v. State, 146 ldaho 599, 602, 200
P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009) (citing Savkhamchone v. State, 127 ldaho 319, 322, 900

P.2d 795, 798 (1995)). The purpose of the 20-day notice requirement of I.C.

3

19-4906(b) is to give the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal
authority or evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterl~v.

State,

121 ldaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen,

102 ldaho 487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678 (1981); Martinez v. State, 126 ldaho 813,
818,892 P.2d 488,493 (Ct. App. 1995).
The district court dismissed Baxter's constitutional claim on a basis other
than that proposed by the state and adopted by the court in its notice of intent to
dismiss without providing the requisite 20-day notice. Any error in the lack of
notice is harmless, however, because Baxter's constitutionality claim ultimately
fails as a matter of law, and no legal authority or evidence Baxter could have
presented would have overcome summary dismissal of his claim.

See

I.R.C.P.

61. ("The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."); Gomez v. State, 120 ldaho 632, 634, 818 P.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1991)
(applying harmless error analysis in post-conviction case).
The

meaning and

effect

of

a statute,

including the

statute's

constitutionality, is a question of law, State v. Hart, 135 ldaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d
850, 852 (2001). Baxter argued in his brief in support of his petition for postconviction relief that the injury to jails statute was vague, alleging that it was "to
[sic] broad" and that "[tlhe state cannot be trusted to decide who gets charged
[sic] and who does not." (R., p. 25.) Baxter's claim is meritless.

In determining whether a statute, such as I.C. § 18-7018 is void for
vagueness, the court must consider (1) whether the statute "gives notice to those
who are subject to it," and (2) whether the statute "contains guidelines and
imposes sufficient discretion on those who must enforce the ordinance." State v.
Hellickson, 135 ldaho 742, 745, 24 P.3d 59, 62 (2001) (citations omitted). "For a
facial vagueness challenge to be successful, the complainant must demonstrate
that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. State v. Casano, 140
Idaho 461, 464, 95 P.3d 79, 82 (2004). The starting place in determining if a
statute is or is not unconstitutionally vague is to look at the defendant's conduct
in question,
Because a defendant 'who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied
to the conduct of others ... [a] court should therefore examine the
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical
applications of the law.' The reason for the suggested analytical
starting point is readily apparent, for if a statute is not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct, it
necessarily is not unconstitutional on its face.
State v. Laramore, 145 ldaho 428, 431, 179 P.3d 1084, 1087 (Ct. App. 2007)
(quotinq Villaqe of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman Estates. Inc., 455 U.S.
489,495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362,369 (1982)). Because Baxter's
claim is a legal claim involving a determination of whether the statute clearly
applied to his conduct, Baxter has not been prejudiced by the court's failure to
grant additional time to investigate or submit additional evidence.
I.C. § 18-7018 provides that
[elvery person who wilfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls
down or otherwise destroys or injures any public jail or other place

of confinement, is punishable by fine not exceeding $10,000, and
by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years.
The plain language of the statute is clear and provides sufficient notice to law
enforcement that if someone commits a wilful and intentional act of causing
damage to a jail, they can be held accountable through this statute. Baxter
himself admits to the wilful and intentional act of causing damage to the phone
located on the wall in the jail.' (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 19-24.) There is sufficient notice in
the statute itself to provide guidance to law enforcement regarding what is a
chargeable offense under the statute.
Baxter's claim that the injury to jails statute is unconstitutional fails as a
matter of law. Any error by the district court in dismissing the claim for a reason
other than that proposed by the state and adopted by the court in its notice of
intent to dismiss was harmless because there was nothing Baxter could have
provided to the court in the form of affidavits, records, or other evidence that
would have had any effect on the ultimate legal question of the constitutionality of
the statute. As such, the order of the district court summarily dismissing Baxter's
post-conviction claim challenging the constitutionality of the injury to jails statute
should be affirmed.

'

Baxter's examples in support of his position that the statute is
unconstitutional ("If a man pukes o [sic] the floor, he could technically be charged
with a felony. If he wears paint off the table sitting in the same spot for an
extended period of time. If he tears his jump suit, wears out his underwear, soils
his sheets due to sickness, or unwitingly [sic] does any mark on any wall in
complete ignorance of the scuff mark he made, he could be charged with a
felony." (R., p. 25)) are not only comprised of unintentional or involuntary
behavior, but are irrelevant to the ultimate inquiry since the statute has been
shown to be valid as applied to his own conduct.

II.
The District Court Correctlv Concluded Baxter Failed To Establish Ineffective
Assistance Of Either Trial Or Appellate Counsel
A.

Introduction
Baxter contends the district court erred in denying his petition for post-

conviction relief because, he argues, he established at the evidentiary hearing
that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and argue that the phone he
damaged in the jail was in fact not owned by the jail itself. (Appellant's brief, pp.
7-8.) Furthermore, Baxter asserts the district court erred in determining that
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an insufficiency of the
evidence claim on direct appeal. Baxter's claims fail. The district court correctly
concluded Baxter is not entitled to post-conviction relief on the issue of ineffective
assistance of trial or appellate counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based.
Estes v. State, 111 ldaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92
ldaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). Where the district court
conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an
appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous,
but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those
facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998);
Gabourie v. State, 125 ldaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of
law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based.
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 ldaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A
trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled
to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 ldaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct.
App. 1990). Furthermore, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v.

State, 103 ldaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982).
C.

Standards Governinq Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
it is well-settled that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must provide admissible evidence that his counsel's performance
was deficient and that the alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v.
Washinqton, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Richman v. State, 138 ldaho 190,
192, 59 P.3d 995, 997 (Ct. App. 2002) ("To prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was
deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency." (citations
omitted)). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must demonstrate
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
Gibson v. State, 110 ldaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986), and overcome
the "strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." Davis v. State, 116 ldaho 401, 406, 775
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).

A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the
alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes "trial counsel was competent and
that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, I 3 0 ldaho
772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). Trial counsel's strategic and tactical
decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for postconviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless the UPCPA petitioner
has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of
the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles v.

State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunninaham v. State, 117
ldaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). "Trial counsel's
decision of which witnesses to call is encompassed in that aspect of trial
counsel's role denominated 'trial tactics' or 'strategic choices."' Cam~bellv.

State, 130 ldaho 546, 548, 944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v.

m,102 ldaho 231, 234, 628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981)). "It is not enough for
an applicant to show that his counsel's performance might have been better and
might have contributed to the conviction. Rather, the applicant must show actual
unreasonable performance by trial counsel and actual prejudice." Milburn v.

m,135 ldaho 701, 706, 23 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Estes v.
m,111 ldaho 430, 434, 725 P.2d 135, 139 (1986)). "The constitutional
requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might
have been tried better." lvey v. State, 123 ldaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709
(1992).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability
that, but for trial counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Araqon v. State, 1 14 ldaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174,
1177 (1988); Cowqer v. State, 132 ldaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App.
1999); Roman v. State, 125 ldaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898,903 (Ct. App. 1994).
The foregoing standards also apply to claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132
ldaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). The relevant inquiry on the prejudice
prong is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
Baxter would have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285
(2000).

D.

The District Court Correctlv A p ~ l i e dThe Law To The Facts When It
Dismissed Baxter's Petition After An Evidentiary Hearing
Baxter asserts the district court erred in denying post-conviction relief

because, he argues,
trial counsel's level of competence and advocacy fell below
the constitutionally acceptable threshold when he failed to argue
that Mr. Baxter did not injure a public jail.
The deficiency of trial counsel resulted in Mr. Baxter being
convicted of a crime he did not commit while also being found to be
a persistent violator. The prejudice is therefore self-evident.
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Baxter's claim fails because, as concluded by the
district court, Baxter failed to prove both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice. (R., p. 112.)

The district court set an evidentiary hearing on the limited "issues involving
ownership of the phone and whether or not counsel properly argued that the
conduct of Mr. Baxter fell within the statute under which he was convicted." (R.,
p. 103.) The only testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing (in addition to
Baxter himself briefly taking the stand) was that of an employee of the company
that provided the phones to the jail. (See Tr.,* pp. 4-12.)

Baxter's argument at

the evidentiary hearing, and on appeal, is that because the jail leased the phones
that were located in the facility for use by the inmates from a phone company, the
phone Baxter pulled off the wall was not the property of the jail, thereby making
the statute he was charged under inapplicable to Baxter's crime. (Tr., p. 15, L.
15 - p. 16, L. 12; Appellant's brief, p. 12.) Because Baxter's trial counsel failed
to investigate this point and raise it at trial, the argument continues, he was
ineffective. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) The district court properly rejected Baxter's
argument.
After hearing the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the
district court determined that the evidence of phone ownership was available for
trial even though Baxter's attorney did not present it to the jury. (R., p. 110.)
However, Baxter failed to present any evidence relating to trial counsel's
investigation of such evidence or the basis of trial counsel's determination not to
elicit the testimony at trial. ( R p. 110) As such, the district court properly
determined that there was insufficient evidence to find that trial counsel's

There are two transcripts associated with this appeal. The transcript of the June
30, 2008 status conference is not cited to in this brief. The February 3, 2009
evidentiary hearing is and is referred to simply as "Tr."

decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective review.
The district court further found that the phone destroyed by Baxter was
"part of a public jail" as the "portion of the damaged property [was] integral to the

operation of the jail" and, as such, Baxter's actions constituted an injury to jail for
purposes of the statute under which Baxter was convicted. (R., p. 111 (emphasis
original).)

I.C.

3

18-7018 provides that "[elvery person who 'willfully and

intentionally breaks down, pulls down or otherwise destroys or injures any public
jail or other place of confinement" is guilty of the offense of injuring jails. The
language of the statute itself does not include as an element ownership of injured
or damaged property. It does not even require that the damage occur in "a jail,"
extending the coverage of the statute to "other place[s] of confinement." Here,
Baxter pulled a phone off of the wall requiring a new phone be installed to repair
the damage. The phone was provided for use by inmates and was located on a
wall of the jail where he was confined. (See Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-9.)
The plain language of the statute supports the district court's ultimate
conclusion that "[gliven this interpretation of the statute Baxter would not have
prevailed on this argument regardless of whether or not his trial counsel had
raised this argument." ( R p I I 1

The court held that

[tlhe jury could not have been instructed on this theory and trial
counsel would not have been permitted to argue this theory. Thus,
even if trial counsel had elicited testimony from the FSH witness
that the phone was owned by FSH there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.

(R., p. 112.) The district court properly determined that Baxter failed to establish
either deficient performance or any resulting prejudice.
E.

Baxter Failed to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Baxter asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in only making a

sentencing argument on direct appeal. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) Baxter argues
that the more successful claim would have been to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence at trial, especially in light of the information elicited at the
evidentiary hearing regarding the ownership of the telephone Baxter destroyed.
(Appellant's brief, p. 15.)
The relevant inquiry on the prejudice prong is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, Baxter would have prevailed
on appeal. As the district court determined, such an argument would have been
unsuccessful under the court's view that the phone destroyed by Baxter was a
part of the jail sufficient to warrant a charge of injury to jails. As such, Baxter has
failed to establish that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to pursue
a claim alleging insufficiency of the evidence at trial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing in part Baxter's petition for post-conviction relief and
dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims following an evidentiary
hearing.
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